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"We are not a multi-national, we are a multi-local." 
—Coca Cola 
One can't read far in the mushrooming literature on globalism without 
encountering this quotation, sometimes four or five times in one anthology. It is 
usually taken as a transparent statement of what, in more vulgar times, would have 
been called "hegemonic intent." But that phrase, and the ideas informing it, have 
been overtaken by a newer wave of theory, one that permits us to ask whether or 
not this slogan actually has a practice. Coca-Cola's 1999 misadventures in 
France, where the government blocked its purchase of Orangina and bottling 
contamination reduced its market share, certainly indicate some local limits. 
Because Coca-Cola and McDonald's now receive half their income overseas, we 
could even ask if they are American companies any longer. 
One doesn't find that kind of analysis in too many of the books cited below. 
They are all concerned with globalism, but most remain focused on theoretical 
treatments. One hungers for the specifics that writing on American history, 
political economy, and literature usually offer, until—as if seen on a passing 
dessert cart—one glimpses the work of area studies scholars. 
Globalism, the term used in this essay, is used to indicate the broader cultural 
context of globalization, which are the changes in economic, marketing, and 
commercial practices that began after World War II, typified by transnational 
flows of capital. It may be helpful to think about modernization, especially after 
World War I, and its relation to Modernism in art and literature. We can see now 
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that there were many modernisms, all prompted by or reacting to modernization, 
but only loosely related to each other. Our post-modern vantage on modernism(s) 
may be suggestive: globalism may appear more homogeneous than it actually is. 
It may also be a category whose descriptive power is waning: modernization and 
globalization continue, but there is already a post-globalism on the cultural 
horizon. 
Although sociologists, economists, historians, and anthropologists had de-
veloped a considerable literature on globalization before the popularity of post-
colonial theory, the work of Edward Said and Homi Bhabha probably brought the 
topic to the attention of most Americanists. Said's Orientalism (1978) is the best-
known of the early post-colonial studies, showing how the West created a version 
of the Orient that was at once exotic and reified, the source of fantasy and the 
object of commodification. His other major work on this topic was Culture and 
Imperialism (1993), in which he continued the grand narrative treatment, but he 
extended his analysis, which was rooted in readings of Rudyard Kipling, Joseph 
Conrad, Giussepe Verdi, Jane Austen, Albert Camus, and William Butler Yeats, 
to a sweeping master-narrative that included contemporary politics: 
Much of the rhetoric of the "New World Order" promulgated 
by the American government since the end of the Cold War— 
with its redolent self-congratulation, its unconcealed 
triumphalism, its grave proclamations of responsibility—might 
have been scripted by Conrad's Holroyd: we are number one, 
we are bound to lead, we stand for freedom and order, and so 
on. No American has been immune from this structure of 
feeling.. . . (xvii) 
Said's subsequent analysis of "imperialism" takes cultural practices, often 
novels, as evidence of economic and political intention, not to mention govern-
ment policy and practice. The problem with failing to consider political economy 
is that no links are shown between the two realms. Said, however, rightfully 
stands first among scholars associated with the discourse of globalization. Much 
other noteworthy scholarship, too much to mention here, followed his line of 
investigation. 
The next significant development is less well known. The content of 
Reinhold Wagnleitner's Coca-Colonization and the Cold War, published in 
Austria in 1991 and in the United States in 1994, is more accurately described by 
its sub-title: "The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the 
Second World War." Even as he employed a totalizing narrative of "coloniza-
tion," drawing heavily on Frank Ninkovich' s The Diplomacy of Ideas (1981) and 
Emily S. Rosenberg's Spreading the American Dream (1982), Wagnleitner 
compiled an astonishing array of data from both sides of the Atlantic, using the 
Freedom of Information Act and other tools. Wagnleitner supplied what Said had 
lacked. He emphasized the economic context (though it turns out that no Coke 
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was for sale during the ten-year [1945-1955] U.S. occupation of Austria) and 
showed the United States attempting to remake Austrian culture—running radio 
stations, newspapers and presses, as well as re-education programs for teachers.1 
This is still the best-researched book in the field, but the data runs in somewhat 
contradictory directions. Marshall Plan officials, Wagnleitner wrote, attempted 
to make Austrians into model consumers of "official" American culture, when 
what Austrians wanted was the unofficial culture—jazz, rock, sexy novels, and 
tape recorders. U. S. officiais refused, but Austrians persisted, so that finally one 
has a sense of reading, not about "coca-colonization," but about the roots of post-
war Austrian consumerism. Here, in fact, was the first hint of something only now 
being developed: the insight that national markets are persistently local. 
If "imperialism" and "colonization" were the first stages of theorizing about 
globalism, John Tomlinson's Cultural Imperialism (1991) was arguably the end 
of this stage. Tomlinson pointed out that the discourse of "imperialism" pio-
neered by Said's earlier work was binary, and that 
Underlying this is the broader discourse of cultural imperial-
ism as the spread of the culture of modernity itself This is a 
global movement towards, among other things, an everyday 
life governed by the habitual routine of commodity capitalism. 
One reason for calling this discourse a broader one is that the 
'imaginary' discourse of cultural identity only arises within the 
context of modernity. (90) 
Tomlinson uses "modernity" here in the sense that I use "modernization," to 
reflect economic and political processes. 
Our culture in the modern world is never purely 'local pro-
duce', but always contains the traces of previous cultural 
borrowings or influence, which have been part of this 'totalising' 
and have become, as it were, 'naturalised.' 
More significantly [these] invented traditions can be seen as a 
phenomenon of modernity. (90-91) 
These are sentences to reflect upon. By distinguishing between processes of 
culture creation and processes of modernity, Tomlinson complicated the discus-
sion of globalism in ways still not appreciated. Then he attacked the notion "that 
people in capitalist culture lack the autonomy to make proper judgements about 
their needs." 
To try to suggest that agents are mistaken about either their 
experienced needs for a range of consumer goods like televi-
sions, microwave ovens, cars, hi-fi sets and fashionable clothes, 
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or about the 'life goals' that these needs represent, is a short 
route to paternalist social philosophy. (128) 
Tomlinson arrived at this position, interestingly, working more-or-less within 
Marxist thought, by synthesizing critiques of the Frankfort School, of Herbert 
Marcuse, Jean Baudrillard, and Henri LeFebvre, with work by Douglas Kellner 
and Claus Offe. This is the most interesting theoretical treatment of globalism. 
Theory about globalism had changed, so that Donald Pease seemed, in his 
introduction to Cultures of United States Imperialism (1993, co-edited with Amy 
Kaplan), to equivocate about his title: 
The emergent discourse of "global-localism" proposes the 
most challenging critique directed against the pre-constituted 
categories anchored in the discourse of anti-imperialism. It 
argues against the colonizer's power to construct the "other" 
out of figures within an ethnocentric unconscious. Because of 
its capacity to violate national boundaries, imperialism, ac-
cording to this critique, should be understood instead as a phase 
in the process of globalization that, in disrupting the coherence 
of the geopolitical entities called nation-states, thereby en-
abled their openness to interconnection with all other nation-
states 
This discourse thereafter insists that colonialism, nationalism, 
and imperialism be understood as interlinked phases in a 
decentered yet encompassing system. (26) 
If you read closely (perhaps twice), this is an accurate summary of attacks on 
the "imperialist" position. Pease's reply was that "Globalism-localism loses sight 
of the economic and cultural exploitation at work in the process" (27); he 
preferred to subsume the former to a critique of imperialism: "Taken together the 
two discourses configure an interpretative crossroads whereby each supplies key 
figures missing from the other" (26). But there is little crossing in his volume; the 
essays, including the most interesting (Slotkin, Warren, and Brannen, for ex-
ample) are written from the older vantage. The notable exception is Walter Benn 
Michaels' "Anti-Imperial Americanism," reminding us that a quite conservative 
discourse at home between 1890 and 1920 was against foreign expansion as 
"unconstitutional." 
As Michaels' topic suggests, an examination of nations and nation building 
was the next logical step. The terms had been formulated in post-colonial theory, 
chiefly by Benedict Anderson (Imagined Communities, 1983) and Homi Bhabha 
(Nation and Narration, 1990; The Location of Culture, 1994). Bhabha can be seen 
as responding to Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's important 1988 essay, "Can the 
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Subaltern Speak?" Spivak was doubtful that the subaltern could, but Bhaha, in 
"Signs Taken for Wonders," gave more credit to the colonized subject ' s linguistic 
agency. Between colonizer and colonized is a "liminal zone," he argued, where 
imagined cultural and national identities are produced: one of his key ideas was 
the creativity of mimicry. The question of "nationalism," most relevant to 
American studies, was then researched thoroughly in the mid-1990s, by Yael 
Tamir {Liberal Nationalism [Princeton, 1993]) David Miller {On Nationality 
[New York, 1995]), and Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan {The Logic of 
Nationalism [New York, 1997]), among others. To varying degrees defenses of 
nationalism or nation-forming impulses, these studies were read, however, 
against the backdrop of genocide in Rwanda and then in Bosnia. 
Here was another turning point, exemplified in Susan Sontag' s taking to task 
these "morosely depoliticized" intellectuals who had defended nationalism and 
their "widespread indifference, or lack of solidarity . . . with the victims of an 
appalling crime."2 At least superficially, this seemed to put defenders of the local 
and the anti-imperial in a corner. Bruce Robbins recounts these debates in Feeling 
Global: Internationalism in Distress (1999). Sontag's appeal, he argues, was 
almost immediately theorized and deconstructed by the intellectuals she attacked, 
and she was drawn into serious debate with John Berger. In Robbins' account, 
post-colonialism then turned on itself. Scholars such as Spivak, Kwame Anthony 
Appiah, and Arif Dirlik (who had attacked the capitalist concept of a "Pacific 
Rim," see below) attacked post-colonial theory circa 1995 as the arriviste face of 
"elite cosmopolitanism." Robbins' account is unconcerned with economics (and 
very deferential to Said), but as intellectual history of this field between 1994 and 
1998, it is a valuable guide. Robbins shows a crisis of confidence overtaking 
scholars of third-world origin who had moved from the "margin" to "centers" 
such as New York and London. 
As this catharsis took place, University of Texas historian Richard Pells 
independently developed a minor theme in Wagnleitner' s work—that Europeans 
had historically created their own versions of "American" culture and imported 
them selectively, often remaking the "American" in local terms. Pells' thorough, 
if sometimes cranky, Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated and 
Transformed American Culture Since World War II (New York, 1997) is an 
historic overview of U.S. cultural policy in Europe from 1945 to 1995. It is 
emphatically an "American Studies" volume. Though Pells does not reply to 
Wagnleitner directly (and may not have been aware of his work), he contextualizes 
the latter's charges about the Marshall Plan, the McCarthy Era, the Cold War, the 
American studies movement, and the Media and Information Ages. He points out 
that the Salzburg Seminars brought F. 0 . Mathiessen, Alfred Kazin, Randall 
Jarrell, Henry Nash Smith, and Margaret Mead (hardly the Imperialist All-Star 
team) to lecture in Austria, as well as the cream of abstract expressionism and 
jazz. Pells reinstates pro-American commentators such as Raymond Aron and 
Luigi Barzini as negotiators between the old and new worlds. American literary 
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theory favorite Jean Baudrillard is sent to the corner. But Pells agrees with 
Wagnleitner about the dominance of American media exports: 
No matter how proficient the Western Europeans or the Japa-
nese were in selling their automobiles or computers throughout 
the world, they could not compete with the United States when 
it came to the export of news, movies, videos, music and 
television programs. The sale of American audiovisual prod-
ucts to Europe alone totaled $3.7 billion in 1992, while in the 
same year Europe sold just $288 million worth of its cultural 
wares to the United States. (211) 
Media are only one category of export, albeit an important one. As Pells notes in 
his last chapter, "The Europeanization of American Culture," European exports 
from Irish beer to Danish furniture, from Austrian skis to French wine and literary 
theory have tipped the U.S. balance of trade into a decade-long deficit. The United 
States is the world's leading exporter, but it is also the world's leading importer, 
in a ratio replicated by no other nation. For Pells, by 1995, all theorizing seemed 
post-mortem: "By the mid-1990s, the American market accounted for only 21 
percent of all the Cokes sold in the world" (327). And investment was following 
the new markets, Pells wrote: "Between 1993 and 1995, American corporations 
invested $150 billion abroad, tripling what they had spent outside the United 
States in the late 1980s" (327). But most French wine, most Austrian skis, and 
most Japanese autos were also sold outside those nations. Globalization had 
arrived. And, for better or worse, the United States, or Coke, or McDonald's had 
become its symbols. 
Marxian theory sought a way back to center stage by following the manifold 
and complex thought of Frederic Jameson's Postmodernism, or, The Cultural 
Logic of Late Capitalism (1997). Brilliant in some of its specific arguments and 
examples, Jameson's book still, finally, denies the inevitability of market 
economies. The "invisible hand" is always "hegemonic" for Jameson. But many 
scholars used Jameson's insights, blended with those of post-colonial, sociologi-
cal, and anthropological theorists such as Benedict Anderson, Marshall Sahlins, 
James Clifford, Clifford Geertz, and Arjun Appadurai, to formulate theories 
about resistance to globalism. 
Duke University became a center for such views. Arif Dirlik, a historian there 
and China expert, attacked the "Pacific Rim" concept in 1993. He sometimes co-
authored with Rob Wilson, a professor of "cultural poetics" in the University of 
Hawaii English Department. Duke University Press published Global/Local 
(1996), edited by Wilson and Wimal Dissanayake, and Cultures of Globalization 
(1998), edited by Jameson (reviewed in this issue), which are among the major 
efforts to put Marxism back in the debate. All attempts to think outside the box 
being useful, they are worth a look. In their introduction to Global/Local, the 
editors focus on concepts of space and geography, employing Henri LeFebvre 
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and, more strikingly, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, to make their critique. 
LeFebrve is an old-time French Marxist whose 1974 The Production of Space 
(translation 1991) is a touchstone among these scholars. Sub-titled "Cultural 
Production and the Transnational Imaginary," Global/Local's thirteen essays 
(plus an interview with Jameson) are divided into three areas: Globalisms, Local 
Conjunctions, and Global/Local Disruptions. Unfortunately, connections be-
tween geography and political economy rarely appear. The essays sparkle with 
formulations such as "the imperializing imaginary," "the imaginary involun-
tary," and "the regional imaginary." But there is nothing as specific and useful as 
Jameson's earlier concepts of "sedimentation" or the "ideologeme" here, or even 
as palpable as Deleuze/Guattari's "desiring machines" (164, 204, 284). But it is 
still a tantalizing project: the global seen as "unified around dynamics of 
capitalogic moving across borders," while the local fragments "into contestory 
enclaves of difference, coalition, and resistance" (1). Unfortunately this is as well 
defined as these terms ever appear, and problems begin immediately, with the 
editors' dizzying assertion that we stand at the "crossroads of an altered and more 
fractal terrain" (1). Did they mean fractured? Fractals are patterns. The inter-play 
of global and local proceeds only one step: "Regions and region-states increas-
ingly override national borders and older territorial forms and create special 
economic zones of uneven development and transcultural hybridity" (2). Even 
this is not new—it derives from Bhabha's emphasis on the liminal and from 
"border theory," already somewhat familiar in American studies. In these zones, 
there's supposedly more possibility for creative resistance. Where, for example? 
What's special about this hybridity? 
The examples should make use of the "post-Fordist" geographers—David 
Harvey, Mike Davis, Edward Soja—whom the editors see pre-figured in 
Lefebvre' s notion that "the class struggle is inscribed in space" (3). Insofar as this 
happens, it is strangely reminiscent of phenomenology. Space, in its economic, 
class, and cultural uses, turns out to be difficult to identify at all, much less 
objectively. More often the contributors seem to be attempting the kind of "thick 
description," not particularly spatial, associated with social scientists such as 
Clifford Geertz, James Clifford, Pierre Bourdieu, and (perhaps less well known) 
Michel de Certeau.3 
Several of the articles are insightful, notably Mike Featherstone's essay on 
British localities and their working class populations and Karen Kelsky's exami-
nation of the Japanese women called "Yellow Cabs" who seek status sex with 
foreigners in Hawaii and Tokyo. Hamid Naficy's essay on Turkish and Iranian 
filmmakers ' thematization of claustrophobia most nearly represents the intent to 
revalorize geography, and Christopher L. Connery's study of the "oceanic" 
trope applied to things formerly "Pacific Rim" has insightful moments. Unfor-
tunately other essays recycle tired attacks on protectionism (Hong Kong 
investors in Vancouver) and several are mediations on film, both mainstream 
(Robocop, Blade Runner) and experimental. Jameson himself, in his interview 
by a South Korean Marxist scholar, is forced into awkward protestations of his 
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orthodoxy and such bon mots as "[Mississippi] is a third world part of the United 
States" (361). 
One of the aims of the volume, the overthrow, or at least radical complication, 
of simple binarisms, seems to be undercut by the continual fetishization of the 
"transnational corporation," to which the "local" is always opposed. No writer in 
the volume has done research on TNCs (the Jamesonian shorthand), or worked 
for one, or even acquired a passing familiarity with the ways of business. Instead 
the Coke slogan represents that realm. "Transnational corporations" and 
"transnational flows of capital" become themselves an "imaginary," capable of 
supernatural action, such as making factories disappear overnight, to be reas-
sembled in Malaysia. Any sense that a high percentage of transnational business 
ventures end in failure is missing (why did the first McDonald's overseas have to 
be closed?). The problems of American business abroad are historic and self-
evident: linguistic narrowness, a cultural myopia that has prevented close reading 
of foreign markets, and a blithe assumption of the evident superiority of American 
products. Media and fast food are prominent American exports, but many basic 
U.S. industries—auto, steel, appliances, furniture, beer, to name only a few—are 
exporting failures. For every Coca-Cola, there is a General Motors. 
Foreign markets are not structured like American markets, though it is 
commonly assumed in writing on globalism that entering business abroad is no 
more difficult than doing so in the United States. But the zaibatsu, or endemic 
corruption, or state-controlled media are not simply pesky equivalents of O.S .H. A. 
Almost everything about selling anything abroad is different: the marketing 
media, the culinary tastes, the periodicity of buying, the holidays, the portion and 
refrigerator sizes, the measuring systems, the packaging, the guarantees, the 
financing, and the product's ultimate disposal. Here we confront an ethnocen-
trism of theory. If such self-mirroring assumptions were made in the analysis of 
another people—creating an Other without investigating the construction of that 
subjectivity—the protest would be immediate. But many theoretical treatments 
of globalization assume that foreign markets mirror American ones. This is bad 
enough, but such approaches also usually treat markets as mysterious, primitive, 
all powerful, and inexplicable. Here a great opportunity is lost because, in my 
experience, it is foreign markets that are persistently and resistantly local. 
If literary/cultural theory about globalism seems to be in the dark about 
economics, there are at least glimmers of light in nearby windows. Some are the 
work of enthusiasts, such as Timothy Ryback, whose Rock Around the Bloc 
(1990) was an early study of how and why Western rock' n' roll was consumed 
behind the Iron Curtain. More recently area studies has produced the most 
specific, if less theorized, work on what I here term globalism. Joseph T. Tobin's 
Remade in Japan (1992) is the most interesting of these. Its thirteen essays detail 
the ways such Western artifacts as Disneyland, French restaurants and Argentine 
tango have been "domesticated for Japanese consumption." Tobin' s introduction 
is a primer on the culturally specific ways in which "domestication" selects the 
appropriate Western goods and then transforms them for Japanese buyers. 
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Readers learn from Millie Creighton's essay how the venerable depaato, or 
department store (established before 1900 in Japan), educates shoppers about 
quality, and from James Stanlaw that English, though present on signs and T-
shirts, has hardly taken. 
The grand narrative of historian John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in 
the Wake of World WarIIXI999), makes no pretense of addressing globalism, but 
its details nonetheless illuminate it. Dower's purpose is to treat the U.S. occupa-
tion of Japan, in the MacArthur Era (1945-1951). But he reports, for instance, that 
the 1950 translation of Norman Mailer's The Naked and the Dead not only made 
the Japanese top-ten bestseller list, but was received by readers in the context of 
the tradition of zange (sincerity, humility, repentance). At the same time, 
Margaret Mitchell's Gone with the Wind (1936) made thertop-ten list two years 
(1949 and 1950) because readers apparently identified with the defiant Scarlet 
O'Hara. Theorizing this apparent contradiction is not Dower's concern, but this 
seems to be the kind of "resistance" that the editors of Global/Local had in mind. 
Also suggestive is Jainying Zha's China Pop: How Soap Operas, Tabloids, 
and Bestsellers Are Transforming a Culture, published in 1995 and seemingly 
overlooked by scholars of globalization. Although written without footnotes, 
indeed without references of any kind (not even a bibliography), this first-hand 
reportage of the culture wars in mainland China before and after Tiananmen 
Square, written by a bilingual mainland native, contains detailed explanations of 
how Chinese entrepreneurs created new soap operas, tabloids, pornography, and 
cuisine after Tiananmen. Zha conceives her task as New Yorker-stylo cultural 
reportage, but she provides great insights on Chinese market formation. China 
Pop is the kind of book that Tomlinson seemed to ask for in 1990. 
Similar but more scholarly is Consuming Russia: Popular Culture, Sex, and 
Society Since Gorbachev ( 1999), a group of twenty richly illustrated essays edited 
by Adele Marie Barker. The essays explores byt, the "common, ordinary life [as 
it] might conceivably function as a site of resistance against the prevailing 
ideology." Note that the latter was and is an elite, high culture, rather than a mass 
market one (31-33). If Barker's theoretical debt is to LeFebvre and de Certeau, 
her contributors seem far less interested in the abstract, ranging over topics from 
post-Soviet "pet life" to pornography, to tattooing, and to the Russian Orthodox 
church. The authors are all Russians or Sinologists. There are few invocations of 
theory, and most footnotes simply offer more examples of the main points. Taken 
with China Pop, this volume offers parallels in soap operas, the popular novel, 
and pornography that beg for connection in theory. 
Americanization and Australia, edited by Philip and Roger Bell, is among 
the most informative of the area studies approaches. Its sixteen short, clear essays 
cover subjects ranging from the impact of American English and sports culture 
to the push-pull relationship between the two nations' feminisms and films. The 
Bells' introduction is one of the best theoretical overviews extant, discussing 
"Americanization" from the perspectives of Jacques Lacan, Mikhail Bakhtin, and 
semiotics (Yuri Lotman). The volume is also unusual in the number of essays— 
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on jurisprudence, race/ethnicity, and political culture—showing the positive 
impact of the United States on the ethical life of another nation. Philip BeM' s essay 
on American television also defies received opinion, showing that only thirty-
eight percent of the cost of Australian programming is foreign purchase and that 
only four of the top twenty programs in October 1997 were of U.S. origin. 
A study that sets an even balance between theory and artifact is Gerd 
Gemunden's Framed Visions: Popular Culture, Americanization, and the Con-
temporary German and Austrian Imagination (1998). From his introductory 
example of Edward Hopper's painting "The Nighthawks" as "refrained" by poet 
Wolf Wondratschek, then by writer Peter Handke and finally by filmmaker Wim 
Wenders, Gemunden shows how the narrative amplifications or reconfigurations 
in the process of cultural borrowing are always local. True, he deals with 
representations (that is, art), but Gemuden's focus on "the productivity of 
reception" is a skillful blending of insights from Dick Hebdige,4 John Tomlinson, 
and Michel de Certeau (17). Subsequent chapters examine Andy Warhol's use of 
surface and depth as transformed by conceptual artist Rolf Dieter Brinkman, 
Rainer Werner Fassbinder's re-use of 1930's American gangster film, Herbert 
Achternbusch' s assault on the genre of the American Western in Der Komantsche 
(1979), and several appropriations and remakings of the American "road film." 
Gemunden locates himself clearly in the debate: the United States may pioneer 
some markets and styles, but so various are the contexts of reception and 
consumption that by the time U.S. products are "absorbed," much less re-
narrated, the "American" component is only first among equals, if that. If political 
economy per se is not addressed here, the implications for it are clear. 
The hint in these area studies volumes for American studies is striking. The 
United States has imported nearly as much foreign culture in the last decade as 
Japan, Germany, or Russia: telenovelas from Mexico, Japanese anime, not to 
mention autos, and French literary theory. In my American city, Cleveland, the 
dominant gas station chain is British-owned, the dominant grocery chain is 
Dutch-owned, and the dominant cinema chain is Japanese-owned. A Mexican 
family just bought controlling interest of the computer chain (CompUSA), and 
my American students are excited about a Japanese novelist, Banana Yoshimoto, 
whose work was translated by an Englishwoman and published by a subsidiary 
of the German firm Bertelesmann. I imagine they read her over French roasted 
coffee at that Milanese-inspired café, Starbucks. How has this happened? What 
does it mean? Do these products and narratives mean the same thing that they do 
in their countries of origin? How are they domesticated? Is there resistance? 
An anecdote by way of suggestion. The last film I saw before leaving the 
United States for Japan was Jim Jarmusch's Ghost Dog (2000). The most 
international of American filmmakers, Jarmusch (from Akron, Ohio) has special-
ized in showing us our strangeness and domesticating the foreign {Stranger than 
Paradise, 1984; Down by Law, 1986; Night on Earth, 1991). In Ghost Dog he 
appropriates the Japanese Hagakure, a collection of the sayings of Yamamoto 
Tsunetomo, a retired samurai, published in 1716 (9). In his film he gives Ghost 
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Dog, his title character (played by Forest Whitaker) the Samurai code and has him 
roam the streets of New York City, cooperating with and then fighting organized 
crime, a story that copies but spoofs countless Mafia films and stereotypes. Along 
the way, Ghost Dog quotes the Hagakure to viewers and bystanders, but only 
those bits compatible with the macho code of the hip-hop sound track and the 
inner-city youth sub-culture depicted. 
The Hagakure read entire is another book, stressing not only the nobility of 
death but the importance of daily bathing, fingernail-clipping, letter-writing, and 
judicious homosexuality: "A younger man should test an older man for at least 
five years, and if he is assured of that person's intentions, then he too should 
request the relationship... to lay down one's life for another is the basic principle 
of homosexuality" (58-59). Tsunetomo-san's thoughts, presented as a whole, 
would locate him so far from the African-American inner city and hip-hop 
soundtrack by RZA that he could never be domesticated for American consump-
tion: 
Personally I like to sleep. And I intend to appropriately confine 
myself more 
And more to my living quarters and pass my life away sleeping. 
(78) 
Until the age of forty, it is best to gather strength. It is 
appropriate to have settled down by the age of fifty. (51) 
Sleeping, middle-aged homosexuals are not Jarmusch's consumers, I ven-
ture. It's quite clear that the Hagakure has been drastically "edited" to be 
compatible with a very specific audience: young, urban, interested in hip-hop 
music and violent films, attracted to the martial arts and by oriental mysticism. 
But these "omissions" are only part of the domestication process, for Ghost Dog 
also taps an audience desire for principled action, integrity, sobriety, and self-
discipline. Insofar as these are traditional American values, the import serves a 
restorative function, allowing a narrative re-valorization of—dare I say?— 
Puritan values. Add the emphasis on group vocal harmonies and book-learning, 
with which Ghost Dog sentimentally ends (neither are present in the Hagakure), 
and this "samurai" film appears less like a cultural import and more like an 
exemplary life. It feels as natural as the latte I sip in the lobby afterwards. 
Does the foreign consumer of American products, cultural and otherwise, not 
feel similarly? We need to know, and the processes of "domestication" have to 
be studied abroad. But they can also be studied at home. Many of the questions 
we ask about globalism have at least partial answers in our own local. Are we 
looking for them there? 
332 William Marling 
Notes 
1. See William Marling, "Theorizing the Export of American Culture from the Marshall Plan 
Experience," Living with America, 1946-1996 (Amsterdam, 37: 53-61, 1997), or William Marling, 
"Coca-Colonization: Reinhold Wagnleitner, Coca-colonization and the Cold War" American Quar-
terly 48:4 (Dec. 1996) 731-39, for my critique of the strengths and weaknesses of this study, which 
Wagneitner and I debated in a plenary session of the European American Studies Association, 
Warsaw, Poland, March 21 -25,1996. Despite my admiration for the study, it does not show that Coca-
Cola attempted to colonize Austria: Coke wasn't even sold there during the occupation. 
2. Susan Sontag, "A Lament for Bosnia: 'There' and 'Here,'" The Nation (December 
25, 1995), 819. 
3. Michel de Certeau, La culture au pluriel, TK PUB 1974; The Practice of Everyday 
Life, translated, 1984. TK PUB 
4. Dick Hebdige, Subculture: The Meaning of Style (New York and London, 1979); 
Hiding in the Light: On Images and Things (New York and London, 1988). 
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